| PBJ vol2.iss2
Bioethics Without
Borders |
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The Moral Implications of Prenatal Genetic Testing
Author Peter
Chipman, Dalhousie University
Faculty
Ms. Meredith Schwartz |
ABSTRACT
The advance of medical technology now
permits many genetic tests to be administered to a fetus in the
womb. The goal of this testing is to determine the potential for
genetically based disorders and disabilities. The use of these
tests has major implications on the decision of a parent to abort
a child based on what information they find in the prospective
child’s genes. Advocates of prenatal testing argue that
it enables the families of these prospective children to make
an informed decision when faced with the possibility of disability.
I argue that this choice is drastically limited by social coercion
through a discriminatory and stereotyped perception of the disabled
community. Permitting an uncontrolled barrage of prenatal genetic
tests will further promote the stereotype of a disabled life,
and thus hinders our societal goal to recognise and promote equality
and individuality. Which disabilities to test for, or what genes
to search for, is a judgement that should be made only through
extensive consultation with members of the disabled community,
including individuals who have suffered from or who have been
directly associated with the disability which is to be tested.
Rapid advances in medical technology coupled
with the recent completion of the Human Genome Project provide unprecedented
insight into the genetic basis of many human diseases and disabilities.
There are currently many technologies that allow early diagnosis
and prediction of the probability of onset of particular diseases,
malformations, defects and disabilities in an unborn child. As these
technologies advance, the scope of accurate prenatal testing is
seemingly limitless and has a future where the identification of
any disorder or trait with a genetic basis becomes increasingly
plausible. It is assumed that most prospective parents will be concerned
with ensuring the birth of a healthy child and will likely adhere
and succumb to the pressures of providing standard of prenatal care
in order to be ensured of the fetus’ good health. In the event
that a genetic or potential genetic disorder is detected, prenatal
diagnosis provides the prospective parents with several different
options, including both mental and financial preparation for the
birth of an abnormal child, the use of fetal treatments against
the detected disease or termination of the pregnancy. Currently,
the reality of prenatal testing is that the most widely used fetal
treatment is the outright termination of the pregnancy. For the
purposes of this discussion, I will assume that it is morally and
legally acceptable that women have the right to terminate any unwanted
pregnancies.
In this essay I address the problem posed by social
influences that pressure parents toward a barrage of prenatal genetic
tests, as well as what restrictions can be imposed upon the availability
of these tests to counteract these pressures. In specific, I suggest
that tests other than those that would identify a fetus with high
probability of infant fatality, severe and chronic pain or severe
cognitive impairment should be withheld from use.
One must assess what sorts of prenatal tests and
genetic screening are currently available and what sorts will eventually
be possible. Analysis of fetal genetic information or chromosomal
abnormalities can be accomplished through procedures such as amniocentesis,
chorionic villi sampling (CVS), maternal serum alpha-foetal protein
assay (MSAFP), and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Structural
and anatomical abnormalities can be assessed through imaging techniques
such as ultrasound, magnetic resonance imaging and fetal echocardiography
(Cunniff, 2004, p.889). Ultrasound is currently the standard of
care for health assessment in all pregnant women regardless of age,
family history and health, while amniocentesis and CVS are utilized
most commonly in pregnancies with woman over the age of 351,
and as second round of testing when a disease is suspected. New
medical genetic technology allows for identification of many genes
known to be associated with particular abnormalities and provides
the option of using the above procedures to screen for these particular
genes. Although many diseases do indeed have a genetic component,
the expression of these diseases does not rely solely on the presence
of the genes, but also on an interaction of the genes and the child’s
environment. In addition, many diseases and malformations result
in factors completely unrelated to the genetic code; such as trauma
incurred during pregnancy or birth, maternal drug use in early pregnancy
or malnutrition in early development. It should be noted that in
many cases, genetic tests identify only those genes that are associated
with a particular disorder and in no way directly contribute to
the development of the disorder2.
The advancement of testing procedures, including a reduced cost
and easier access will increase the number of tests routinely administered
during pregnancy and will compromise a woman’s autonomy in
regards to which tests are necessary and which are desired.
The pressures placed upon expecting mothers are not
necessarily imposed directly through coercion by the genetic counsellor3
or family, but generally through what is socially perceived to be
an acceptable level of care required during pregnancy. It is assumed
that parents are concerned with having a healthy child and ensuring
the proper care for that child4.
As technologies advance, the meaning of proper care may encompass
certain procedures that accomplish little more than to warn the
pregnant woman of a potential for a fetal disability or abnormality.
The perceived burdens of raising a disabled child pressures expecting
parents to request a particular test (Lippman, 1991, p. 402). Should
the fetus exhibit traits that promote a particular disability, the
parents may seem to have little choice but to abort the pregnancy.
The increased use of unnecessary tests will further perpetuate the
unfounded societal belief that these tests are necessary to produce
a healthy child and may subsequently perpetuate ignorance and discrimination
toward the disabled community. People may start to wonder why these
individuals were not identified and aborted, and would thus perceive
them as reproductive errors or oversights. The perpetuation of these
beliefs is ultimately detrimental to efforts in society to promote
equality.
It is a disturbing perception that the disability
is the primary defining feature of a disabled individual (Asch,
1999, p.1653). Those women who receive prenatal tests only to discover
that their child may be disabled tend to focus on the disability
rather than the possibility of giving birth to a caring and loving
child who will potentially develop their own personality and provide
their own contributions to society5.
The point of emphasis is that the potential of a disabled fetus
is no different from the potential of an ‘abled’ fetus.
The only difference arises from the ideals imposed in society as
to what constitutes meaningful potential as a human being. For instance,
emphasis is placed upon those who are intelligent, attractive and
athletic. A disabled person may be none of those, but may be more
caring, considerate, and thoughtful than an individual with the
qualities above. Which qualities are more important and valued in
society should be carefully assessed and reconsidered – although
this is much easier said than done.
Many argue that prenatal testing enables the families
of prospective children to make an informed decision6
when faced with the possibility of disability. Jeffrey Botkin, a
proponent of prenatal testing argues that, “parents in this
circumstance are not harmed by the suffering of the child…but
rather by their time, efforts, and expenses to support the special
needs of an individual with Down syndrome…” (Botkin,
1995, p.36). Although Botkin acknowledges that the affected individual
does not personally suffer from the disability, he emphasizes that
a large burden is imposed upon the family. He defines a burden as
the amount of time, effort and expenses provided by the family to
support the child with a disability. Adrienne Asch (1999, p.1653)
argues that although the amount of support needed to raise a child
who suffers from a particular disability is not questioned, it is
interesting that the benefits received through this level of involved
care are not assessed or weighed against the burdens. Caring for
a disabled child is a difficult task, but such a difficult task
must reap rather large emotional rewards. Additionally, Botkin does
not address the dichotomy between those burdens imposed by gifted
children and those imposed by disabled children (Asch, 1999, p.1653).
According to Botkin’s criteria, a child who becomes interested
in pursuing a career in professional hockey may impose much more
of a burden upon their family than does a disabled child.7
The dichotomy lies in the appreciation society has of each of the
two individuals. The fault is placed on a society that skews the
perception of an ability and disability. Abby Lippman (1991, p.404)
argues that instead of creating additional social support programs
to care and provide for those disabled persons, society expects
to solve these ‘problems’ through medical and technological
interventions. Interestingly, social programs that accommodate to
the needs of gifted individuals are not difficult to come across.
An additional argument in support of prenatal genetic
screening relates to the difficulties and pressures imposed upon
the prospective disabled child. Proponents argue that these difficulties
would far exceed the benefits one may experience in such a life.
By this description, it would be unfair to bring into the world
a child who would outright be denied the “right of an open
future” (Asch, 1999, p.1652). Numerous problems arise out
of this argument, namely the distinction between a life with a disability
versus no life at all, or non-existence. Differing levels of disability
would undoubtedly generate different arguments. For instance, non-existence
would likely be preferable to a life full of chronic, inescapable
physical pain and anguish8.
Physical pain may be reduced through drug programs, but may not
altogether eradicate it. A life dominated by drug use seems less
than desirable, but is this sufficient to justify non-existence?
Who, but the individual affected, can decide the value of a life?
Here it is important to identify the difference between a life completely
plagued by burdens and one perceived to be plagued by burdens9.
I argue that it is not the individual that determines dissatisfaction,
but the structure of society in which the individual lives that
ultimately determines the ability and willingness of an individual
to live with his/her disability.
Mental anguish is essential in quality of life assessments,
although the level of social contribution towards this anguish is
difficult to illustrate and determine. Individuals with similar
disabilities may report a wide range of personal experiences, depending
upon their environment and subsequently their expectations of living
with their disability. These expectations are constructed through
social experiences with not only the individual’s parents
and family, but through interactions with peers and the general
public. Obvious physical abnormalities and mental retardation may
be criticised in certain social environments, and such an individual
may suffer low self-esteem and may consequently have negative expectations
of living a life with his or her disability. However, if these individuals
were raised in an environment where they are integrated and accepted
regardless of their apparent disability, then these individuals
would likely report a higher level of self-esteem and have more
positive expectations of a life with a disability. Expectations
would affect how an individual weighs the burdens of his or her
life.
Considering the above arguments, there are certain
foreseeable circumstances when a disability is not worth the life
or risks associated with it to the mother and prospective child.
If the chances for a live birth are slim, the fetus may be aborted
in favour of the potential risks to the mother associated with carrying
a severely defected child to term10.
A disease, which carries with it chronic and uncontrollable pain,
or severely impaired cognitive development to those affected, may
nullify the chance for an enjoyable life. These cases likely justify
abortion of the affected fetus, and thus screening for these disorders
may be permitted. The decision of which disabilities fit these criteria
should only be made by those who have been personally affected by
the disability in question11.
It is only through consultation with the disabled community that
the true quality of life associated with the disease may be assessed
and a decision about whether or not to allow screening can be made.
If individuals with the disorder cannot communicate the degree of
their quality of life12,
then the decision may pass to the parent, geneticist or obstetrician
where a consensus can be made.
Variations in social experiences arise mainly due
to what is considered normal13
in society. The public may regard individuals that are different
as either a threat or an being inferior or may simply generalise
to encompass a further difference in human characteristics such
as thoughts, feelings and emotions. Thus, the problem arises from
the general societal view that disabled is different, and different
infers a level of difficulty and subsequent dissatisfaction in life.
Here there must be a distinction made between what is dissatisfaction
and what is difficulty. Certain difficulties are part of life for
everyone and it is how people deal with these difficulties that
determines the quality of their lives and their overall level of
satisfaction. Indeed there are some people who do report that their
lives may be complicated by disability, but these individuals consider
it simply as a personal quality they must use to navigate throughout
life. Additionally, the difficulties encountered by the disabled
are largely socially rather than biologically imposed (Asch, 1999,
p. 1653). Most disabled people report that their only dissatisfaction
in life arises due to their unemployment and associated problems
with income, and health insurance (US), encountered as a result
of discrimination. A mother may feel pressured to abort an ‘abnormal’
fetus because it may encounter difficulties and discrimination as
a result of his/her disability. The decision to abort a fetus with
such a disadvantage thus completes the vicious circle. It will only
compound the perception that disability is undesirable.
Several lines of research indicate that the ‘abled’
population perceives the quality of life of the disabled population
as significantly less desirable than do those living with disabilities.
A study preformed by Ray & West (1984, p.83) indicated that
individuals living with spinal cord injury reported an increase
in positive self image after becoming disabled. Several other groups
of disabled people seem to be satisfied with their lives and report
the quality of life as being better than unaffected individuals
perceive it to be. In fact, a certain group of deaf individuals
have been reported to not only prefer having a deaf child, but would
use prenatal screening to selectively terminate those fetuses that
can hear (Dennis, 2004, p.894). Certain individuals maintain that
their exclusion from the hearing world enables them to create closer,
more intimate bonds between themselves and other deaf individuals,
and prefer to share these experiences with their children. Although
this is an extreme and seemingly isolated case, it clearly illustrates
that certain disabled individuals do not lead difficult and painful
lives but may in fact lead lives that they perceive as being superior
to those without their ‘disability’.
Aborting a disabled fetus solely due to a disability
in which no valid or justifiable harm can be proven to the future
individual may be considered a form of discrimination against individuals
with the disability. Many individuals in the disabled community
fear that uncontrolled genetic tests will eventually reduce the
number of individuals in their population and thus create a higher
level of discrimination (Gollust et al., 2005, p.37). Women who
refuse prenatal tests or abortion after a positive test could be
held financially responsible for their ‘irrational’
decisions. Support programs for a disabled child may not be as readily
available if the option to avoid having the child is present. However,
it must be kept in mind that many diseases do not have a genetic
basis and the elimination of disability through prenatal screening
is impossible. While screening would not eliminate disability, it
would undoubtedly propagate the social stigma against the acceptance
of those individuals. The propagation of negativity towards a certain
group is always an undesirable consequence.
The goals of prenatal testing primarily intend to
prevent the hardships and burdens of a life with disabilities for
both the mother and the prospective child. Secondary to the benefits
obtained from these tests are the moral implications that result
on a society that is already distanced from, and discriminates against,
the disabled community. This could then be considered a step in
the wrong direction in a society that seems to want to promote equality.
Widespread uses of prenatal testing will primary affect and worsen
the discrimination and distance which is already present in the
disabled community. Providing a woman with a barrage of prenatal
tests does not allow for a sufficient level of choice in regards
to whether or not a disabled child should be carried to term, as
social pressures drastically limit this choice. The only way to
limit social coercion to abort a disabled fetus is to limit the
use of prenatal tests and impose certain restrictions through consultation
with members of the disabled community.
1
These tests are meant to follow an ultrasound diagnosis of potential
problems, but are increasingly being used by many pregnant woman
regardless of the potential for disease.
There are single genes that have been directly linked to disorders,
such as the case for Huntington’s disease and muscular dystrophy
(Chan & Chan, 1997, p.173).
Genetic counsellors are in fact instructed not to provide any sort
of direction in regards to decisions about termination of the pregnancy
(Cunniff et al. 2004, p.889)
It is not through a concern for the health of the child that termination
is considered, but rather a chance for the parents to produce a
child with a socially acceptable level of health.
An infant or fetus can only be measured by its potential, although
those affected by different levels of severity will show differing
levels of social aptitudes as well.
A decision in this sense would mean whether or not to abort a disabled
fetus.
Supporting a child’s interest in such an expensive sport and
one of such high competition demands the investment of countless
dollars and hours into providing expensive equipment, timely delivery
to early morning practices and games, and the potential for lengthy
hospital visits.
Although this case represents one extreme end of a continuum.
Herein lies the fundamental problem of a perceptive reality, where
an individual creates their reality based on their perceptions of
what a particular life is to be. Such perceptions are based on social
influences.
If such an action is so desired. Many woman suffer mentally even
from aborting a doomed fetus due to the nature of abortion. Some
prefer to let nature take its course rather than actively killing
the fetus.
Understandably, the level of severity by which an individual suffers
from the disability will affect his/her opinion on the morality
of prenatal testing. An individual who suffers considerably from
a particular disease would be more likely to support prenatal testing
for it (Gollust et al., 2005, p.39).
Inability to communicate entails an inability to comprehend due
to severe cognitive impairment or early death resulting form the
disease. It does not imply those with language disorders.
Definitions of normalcy vary, but may be considered as being those
combinations of traits that are found in the majority of the population.
REFERENCES
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Peter
Chipman was an undergraduate at Dalhousie
University at the time of writing this submission.
After graduating with a BS in Neuroscience in 2005,
Peter Chipman began working with disabled children
in the regional school system as a substitute Educational
Program Assistant. He will be attending Dalhousie
University in the fall of 2006 to obtain a Masters
in Anatomy and Neurobiology.
EMAIL
pchipman@dal.ca Ms. Meredith
Schwartz is the sponsor for this submission.
She is currently a PhD student and Teaching Assistant
of Philosophy at Dalhousie University..
ADDRESS
Maynard St. Apt 9
Halifax, Canada, NS, B3K3T5
EMAIL meredith.schwartz@dal.ca |
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Asch, A. (1999) Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge
to Practice and Policy, American Journal of Public Health;
89(11):1649-1657
- Botkin J. (1995) Fetal Privacy and Confidentiality, Hastings
Center Report; 25(3); 32-39
- Cunniff C. et al. (2004) Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis for
Pediatricians, Pediatrics; 114; 889-894
- Dennis, C. (2004) Deaf by Design, Nature; 431; 894-896
- Gollust SE. et al. (2005) Community Involvement in Developing
Policies for Genetic Testing: Assessing the Interests and Experiences
of Individuals Affected by Genetic Conditions, American Journal
of Public Health; 95(1); 35-41
- Lippman A. (1991) Prenatal Genetic testing and Screening: Constructing
Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, American Journal of Law and
Medicine; 17; nos.1&2; 15-50. Reprinted in Health Care Ethics
in Canada (2004), eds. Baylis F et al. with the permission of
the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics and Boston
University
- Ray C & West J. (1983) Social. Sexual and Personal Implications
of Paraplegia, Paraplegia; 22; 75-86
- V Chan J& TK Chan J. (1997) Prenatal Diagnosis of Common
Single Gene Disorders by DNA Technology, Hong Kong Med J;
3(2); 173-178
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